Supervisor: Michael Ossipoff <>
Announced end of poll: January 1, 2025
Poll has not yet ended.
This is a public poll.
Actual votes cast: 86
Number of winning choices:
Condorcet completion rule:    (What is this?)
Minimax
CIVS Ranked Pairs
Schulze/Beatpath
MAM
Condorcet-IRV
Proportional

Poll description

This is a poll to find out 1) which ones of these 7 good voting-systems would be accepted; & 2) and which of them is the overall favorite among poll-respondents.

It’s a rank-balloting poll, in which you’ll be asked to rank the voting-systems in order of preference.

Let me briefly define 7 good voting systems, and briefly state a few of their main advantages.

The poll-ballot will immediately follow that discussion.

I'll start with the 2 most briefly-defined and easily implemented voting-systems, and then discuss 5 rank-balloting voting-systems.

In voting-system discussion, the word "method" is used to mean "voting-system", and that's what I mean here when I say "method".

1. Approval Voting: Definition: You can, by marking their names on the ballot, "approve" as many or as few candidates as you want to.

The winner is the candidate approved by the most voters.

Advantages:

(The other methods’ “advantages” sections are much briefer than this one.)

1. You never have any possible reason to vote someone else over your favorite (That's called the "Favorite-Burial-Critrerion" (FBC)--I'll cite FBC for most of the other voting-systems here, as well..).

2. The most easily-implemented. Doesn't require any new software, balloting-equipment or new kind of ballots. The only change is 2 words added to the ballot-instruction: Where it now says "Vote for 1", it would instead say "Vote for 1 or more". Cost of change to Approval voting: Zero.

3. Approval is “Set-Voting”. You can vote any set of candidates, chosen by you, over the others, by approving only them.

2. Score Voting:

You assign to each candidate a rating from 0 to 10, or from 0 to 100, etc.

The winner is the candidate whose ratings-total, among all the voters, is the highest.

Advantages:

Same as Approval.

The flexible ratings allow more expressivity.

3. Instant-Runoff (IRV):

Definition:

You vote a ranking of candidates.

The Count:

Repeatedly, delete from all the rankings the candidate who currently tops the fewest rankings.

When one candidate tops most of the rankings, s/he wins.

[end of IRV definition]

Advantages & Disadvantage:

Has no chicken-dilemma.

IRV has some excellent properties, but it can eliminate the middle compromise, causing some people to rank that compromise over their favorite, to protect the compromise from elimination.

IRV shouldn’t be enacted unless people understand and accept that problem, and wouldn’t feel the need to rank someone over their favorite.

4. Bucklin:

Definition:

Stepwise Approval. You vote a ranking. In each of successive “rounds”, each ballot gives a vote to each candidate that it ranks at the rank-level corresponding to that round.

For example, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to its 1st-ranked candidate(s). In the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to its 2nd-ranked candidate(s)….etc.

If, in a round, one or more candidates gets a majority (a vote total greater than half the number of voters), then the one with the most votes wins.

If, when all the rankings have given votes to all of their candidates, no one has a majority, then the candidate with the most votes wins.

[end of Bucklin definition]

Advantages:

Meets FBC (defined above).

More stable than IRV. No unpleasant compromise-elimination surprises.

Was used in at least 39 cities during the Progressive Era.

5. Benham’s Method:

Definition:

Do IRV until there’s an un-deleted candidate who pairwise-beats each one of the other un-eliminated candidates.

X pairwise-beats Y if more voters rank X over Y than vice-versa.

[end of Benham’s method definition]

Advantage:

Shares IRV’s advantages, but always elects a candidate who pairwise-beats everyone else.

6. MDDA:

Definition:

You rank, in order of preference, the candidates whom you especially want to elect (instead of someone else winning). You’re counted as approving every candidate that you rank, unless you expressly deny them approval.

The winner is the most approved candidate who doesn’t have another candidate ranked over hir by a majority.

Additionally, you have the option to indicate that you deny approval to any 1 or more candidates whom you rank. Advantages:

Meets FBC

Has no chicken-dilemma problem.

Particularly good protection for higher-ranked candidates over lower-ranked ones. Especially for top-ranked candidates over all other ones.

Disadvantage:

Can fail “Mono-Add-Plump” criterion, meaning that the addition of a new ballot to the election can cause a candidate to lose, though he’d win without the addition of the new ballot—and can do so even if that ballot votes only for that candidate.

That’s a purely cosmetic “embarrassment criterion”, without any operational or strategic importance. It doesn’t cause any voting problem. But of course it has to be disclosed anyway.

7. MDDAsc

Same as MDDA, but with one additional rule:

For any pair of candidates whom you don’t rank, you’re counted as ranking each one over the other, with half of a vote.

[end of MDDAsc definition]

Advantage over MDDA:

Doesn’t fail Mono-Add-Plump.

Disadvantage compared to MDDA:

Less reliable protection of higher middle-ranked candidates against lower middle-ranked candidates. (But still fully protects top-ranked candidates against everyone else.)

Protection of middle-ranked candidates against eachother is less important than protecting all ranked candidates against unranked ones, and protecting top-ranked against the others.

-----------------------------------------

Below is the ballot.

Raise, above bottom (above 8th place) every voting-system that you’d vote to enact, in an enactment-initiative vote.

It doesn’t matter what rank-level you raise them to, as long as you raise them above 8th place.

If you have a preference between the candidates that you raise above 8th place, then rank them in order of preference.

If you don’t have preference among them, the you can just rank them all at the same rank-level, such as 1st place, for example.

In fact, if you don’t have preference among some subset of the voting-systems, you can rank them together at the same rank-position.

The 8th alternative is “Leave this one at bottom”. Leave it at bottom, so that everything that you raise above bottom will be counted as being voted over “Leave this one at bottom”. That will tell me how many people voted each voting-system above bottom. So here’s the ballot, directly below this line:

Result

1. Score  (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices)
2. Approval  loses to Score by 40–34
3. Benham  loses to Score by 50–20, loses to Approval by 49–25
4. Instant-Runoff  loses to Score by 47–28, loses to Benham by 37–30
5. MDDA  loses to Score by 52–17, loses to Instant-Runoff by 40–29
6. Bucklin  loses to Score by 51–19, loses to Instant-Runoff by 35–33
7. MDDAsc  loses to Score by 53–14, loses to Bucklin by 32–25
8. Leave this one at bottom  loses to Score by 69–4, loses to MDDAsc by 59–3

For simplicity, some details of the poll result are not shown. 

Result details

  12345678
1. Score   -40 50 47 52 51 53 69
2. Approval   34 -49 49 53 56 56 73
3. Benham   20 25 -37 35 31 35 61
4. Instant-Runoff   28 28 30 -40 35 43 61
5. MDDA   17 21 25 29 -30 28 60
6. Bucklin   19 18 28 33 30 -32 60
7. MDDAsc   14 18 24 25 16 25 -59
8. Leave this one at bottom   4 3 2 6 3 4 3 -

Ballot reporting was not enabled for this poll.

Feel like voting on something else? Try one of these public polls:

Loading...